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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lynn Lewis Schwab appeals from the judgment and conviction entered 
upon his guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After his September 2010 arrest in Boise, Idaho, the state charged 
Schwab with driving under the influence, driving without a valid driver's license, 
and failure to provide proof of insurance. (R., pp.32-33.) Because Schwab had 
two prior DUI convictions within the previous 10 years, the state charged him with 
felony DUI. (Id.); I.C. § 1B-B005(6). 
Schwab filed a motion in limine to prohibit the state from using his 200B 
Montana DUI conviction to enhance his new DUI charge to a felony. (R., pp.47-
75.) Specifically, Schwab argued that his prior Montana DUI conviction was 
entered in violation of his federal and Idaho constitutional rights to counsel and to 
be present at trial, and Montana statutory law. (R., pp.50-5B.) 
Following his 200B Montana DUI arrest, Schwab made an initial court 
appearance, and was informed of his right to counsel. (R., pp.66, 123-124.) 
However, he told the court that he hoped to obtain private counsel. (R., pp.59, 
123-124.) The Montana trial court ordered Schwab to "personally appear for 
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arraignment or trial. ,,1 (R., p.67.) Schwab then left Montana, never hired 
counsel, and never again appeared in a Montana court in his DUI case. (R., 
pp.59-60, 124.) Nor did Schwab ever contact the Montana trial court to request 
that counsel be appointed for him. (R., pp.86-87, 95.) After Schwab failed to 
appear at a Montana pre-trial, or, "omnibus" hearing, the court issued a bench 
warrant, scheduled a trial, and sent notice of the trial date to Schwab's address 
on record, "1101 Chamberlain St. Boise, ID 83706." (R., pp.68-69, 124.) 
Consistent with Montana law,2 Schwab was tried and found guilty of 
misdemeanor DUI, in absentia, when he failed to appear at his scheduled trial. 
(R., pp.74, 124.) 
Through his motion in limine and affidavits, Schwab alleged that he never 
provided the "1101 Chamberlain St." address to either the arresting officer or the 
Montana court, and instead provided his correct Fairfield, Idaho physical and 
mailing addresses. (R., pp.51-52; 60.) Schwab "believe[d] that the Chamberlain 
Street address was the address listed on [his] driver's license at the time of the 
Montana proceedings." (Id.) In addition, Schwab alleged that he believed the 
1 While the Montana trial court's written "Order For Conditions Of Bail/Notice Of 
Hearing Or Trial" did not include a checkmark on the box labeled "Must 
Personally Appear For All Court Appearances" (R., p.67), the trial court later 
issued a bench warrant for Schwab's "Failure to Appear At Omnibus Hearing On 
7/22/2008 at 10:00 AM As Ordered By The Court." (R., p.68.) Because the 
Montana trial court did not maintain transcripts or audio recordings of the 
proceedings in Schwab's DUI case, it is unclear when and how, if at all, the trial 
court specifically ordered Schwab to appear at the 7/22/08 hearing. 
2 Montana, by statute, provides courts with the discretion to proceed with a trial in 
a misdemeanor criminal proceeding without the defendant's presence, "[i]f the 
defendant's counsel is authorized to act on the defendant's behalf ... or if the 
defendant is not represented by counsel." M.C.A. § 46-16-122. 
2 
Montana DUI charge was resolved when the assigned Montana prosecuting 
attorney called him and offered to amend the DUI charge to inattentive driving. 
(R., pp.51, 59-60.) Per that agreement, alleged Schwab, he would agree to 
plead guilty to inattentive driving, he would not have to travel back to Montana, 
and the prosecutor "would take care of the paperwork." (ld.) 
The state investigated Schwab's claims. That investigation revealed that 
the "1101 Chamberlain St." address never actually appeared on Schwab's 
driver's license, and Schwab wasn't even able to present any driver's license to 
the arresting officer in Montana. (R., pp.86, 90, 97-106.) Instead, a sworn 
affidavit from the assigned Montana prosecutor indicated that Schwab had 
provided the false "1101 Chamberlain Sf' address to both the arresting officer, 
and to the court. (R., pp.91.) That sworn affidavit also indicated that the 
Montana prosecutor never contacted Schwab about his Montana DUI case, and 
never made an offer to amend Schwab's DUI charge to "inattentive driving" (a 
crime that does not exist in Montana). (R., pp.92-95.) 
Following a hearing on the motion in limine in the present case, the district 
court, in a memorandum decision, concluded that Schwab intentionally provided 
false contact information to the Montana trial court, and thus waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in the Montana case through his conduct, 
specifically, by keeping himself "deliberately ignorant of the trial date." (R., 
pp.123-130; see generally Tr.) The district court then denied Schwab's motion in 
limine to strike the Montana DUI conviction. (R., pp.123-130.) 
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Schwab entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, reserving his right 
to appeal the district court's denial of his motion in limine. (R., pp.142-144.) The 
district court sentenced Schwab to two years fixed, and five years indeterminate 
for the felony DUI, but suspended the sentence and placed Schwab on probation 
for seven years. (R., pp.150-155.) Schwab timely appealed. (R., pp.160-162.) 
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ISSUES 
Schwab states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in denying Schwab's Motion 
in Limine where the record does not support a conclusion 
that the Montana Court followed Montana's statutory 
procedure for trying a defendant in a misdemeanor case in 
abstentia and without counsel? 
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding the State had met 
its burden to demonstrate that Schwab's 2008 Montana DUI 
conviction, used to enhance his Idaho DUI charge to a 
felony, was constitutionally sound? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Schwab failed to Show the district court erred in denying his motion in 
limine? 
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ARGUMENT 
Schwab Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion In 
Limine 
A. Introduction 
Schwab contends that the district court erred in denying his motion in 
limine to prohibit his Montana DUI conviction from being used to enhance a later 
Idaho DUI charge to a felony. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Specifically, 
Schwab contends that the district court should have entertained collateral attacks 
to his Montana DUI conviction on grounds beyond the alleged violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that in any event, the district court erred 
in concluding that Schwab waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the 
Montana case. (Id.) 
However, Schwab's claims fail because under Idaho law, once the state 
makes a prima facie showing of the validity of a prior DUI conviction, a defendant 
may only challenge that prior conviction on Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
grounds. Further, the district court correctly found that Schwab waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel with respect to the Montana case through his 
conduct of remaining willfully ignorant of the proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,841,118 P.3d 160, 173 (Ct. App. 
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2005); State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); 
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Schwab Is Only Entitled To Challenge His Montana DUI Conviction On 
Sixth Amendment Grounds 
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(6), the state may enhance a defendant's third 
driving under the influence charge to a felony. To enhance a third charge of 
driving under the influence to a felony, the state must first make a prima facie 
showing of the existence of the prior two convictions upon which it relies. State 
v. Coby, 128 Idaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 (1996). This showing "requires 
only that the State produce the judgments of conviction or other evidence of the 
existence of the convictions." kL. After the state has produced the prior 
judgments of conviction, the defendant may challenge the use of the prior 
convictions by producing evidence establishing that one or more of the 
convictions was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. kL. 
Once the defendant raises a triable issue of fact concerning whether he was 
afforded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or that he did not properly waive 
the right, the burden of proof is then upon the state to rebut the defendant's 
evidence and convince the court that no violation of the defendant's rights 
occurred. kL.; State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 37, 844 P.2d 18, 19 (1992). 
Schwab contends on appeal, as he did below, that he is entitled to attack 
his prior Montana DUI conviction not just on Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
grounds, but also pursuant to other federal constitutional rights, the Idaho 
Constitution, and Montana statutes. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-21.) Specifically, he 
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alleges that the state may not rely on his 2008 Montana conviction to enhance 
his new DUI because that conviction was entered contrary to M.C.A. § 46-16-122 
(2)(d), his Idaho constitutional right to appear at trial in person and with counsel, 
and his federal constitutional right to appear at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) 
However, it is clear that the only challenge that a defendant may make in 
these circumstances is one that the prior DUI conviction was entered contrary to 
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Custis v. United States, 511 
U.S. 485, 496 (1994); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004); State v. 
Warren 135 Idaho 836,840-841,25 P.3d 859, 863-864 (Ct. App. 2001) (adopting 
the holding in Custis). 
Prior to Custis v. United States, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed a 
willingness to consider collateral challenges to prior DUI convictions on grounds 
other than a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Beloit, 123 Idaho at 
37, 844 P.2d at 19 (recognizing that after the defendant raises a triable issue of 
fact concerning whether he was "accorded all of his rights," the burden is then 
upon the state to rebut the defendant's evidence and convince the court that "no 
violation of the defendant's rights occurred.") (emphasis added, citations 
omitted); see also State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505,511,873 P.2d 150, 156 (1994) 
(considering, approximately one month before the United States Supreme Court 
entered its opinion in Custis v. United States, defendant's claim that the guilty 
pleas he entered for his prior DUI charges were not made knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily, and did not comply with the requirements of I.C.R. 11 (c).). 
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However, in Custis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant's due process right to collaterally attack a conviction used 
for enhancement purposes in a subsequent proceeding is limited to the singular 
constitutional defect of failure to appoint counsel. kL. at 496. Therefore, pursuant 
to Custis, there is no constitutional right to challenge the constitutional validity of 
a prior DUI conviction on any other constitutional or statutory ground. See 
Partee v. Hopkins, 30 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[t]here is no federal 
constitutional right to collaterally attack a prior conviction used to enhance a 
sentence on any constitutional ground other than failure to appoint counsel for an 
indigent defendant."); State v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575, 580 (Hawaii 2003) 
(recognizing that in Custis, "the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a 
defendant's constitutional right to mount a collateral attack did not extend beyond 
situations where the prior convictions were obtained in violation of the right to 
counsel."). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals adopted Custis in Warren, 135 Idaho at 840-
841, 25 P.3d at 863-864. The state had utilized Warren's prior aggravated 
battery conviction to enhance his new felony charge pursuant to the Idaho 
persistent violator statute (I.C. § 19-2514). Warren, 135 Idaho at 838-839, 25 
P.3d at 861-862. Warren argued that his trial counsel on the new felony was 
constitutionally ineffective for incorrectly advising him that he could not present 
evidence collaterally attacking his prior aggravated battery conviction on 
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. .kL Citing Custis, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals recognized that "the United States Supreme Court held that a 
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defendant's due process right to collaterally attack a conviction used for 
sentencing enhancement purposes in a later proceeding is limited to the 
constitutional defect of failure to appoint counsel." ~ at 840, 25 P.3d at 863. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals then held that Warren had no constitutional right to 
challenge the validity of his prior conviction based upon a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. ~ The Court also expressly declined to hold that Warren 
had any greater rights to collaterally attack his prior convictions under the Idaho 
Constitution. ~ at 841,25 P.3d at 864. 
In adopting Custis, the Idaho Court of Appeals referenced the policy 
concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court: 
Ease of administration also supports the distinction [between 
Sixth Amendment challenges and other constitutional or statutory 
challenges to prior convictions]. As revealed in a number of the 
cases cited in this opinion, failure to appoint counsel at all will 
generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from an 
accompanying minute order. But determination of claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to assure that a guilty 
plea was voluntary, would require sentencing courts to rummage 
through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state court 
transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may 
come from anyone of the 50 States. 
The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides 
additional support for our constitutional conclusion. As we have 
explained, "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine 
confidence in the integrity of our procedures" and inevitably delay 
and impair the orderly administration of justice. (Citations omitted). 
By challenging the previous conviction, the defendant is asking a 
district court "to deprive [the] [state court judgment] of [its] normal 
force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent purpose 
other than to overturn the prior judgmen[t]." (Citation omitted). 
Warren, 135 Idaho at 841,25 P.3d at 864 (quoting Custis, 511 U.S. at 496-497). 
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Then, in Weber, 140 Idaho at 92-96, 90 P.3d at 317-321, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that a defendant could not collaterally attack his prior DUI 
convictions pursuant to either I.C.R. 11, or constitutional standards intended to 
ensure that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary. In so doing, the Idaho 
Supreme Court expressly overruled Beloit and Maxey "to the extent that [those 
opinions] appear to provide a basis for a defendant to collaterally attack the 
validity of prior DUI convictions on ground other than the denial of counsel." 
Weber, 140 Idaho at 96, 90 P.3d at 321. The Court also reiterated the policy 
considerations described in Custis and Warren, and added, "allowing a collateral 
attack on prior convictions on the basis of inadequate plea colloquies would force 
the sentencing court to look behind every conviction with practically no record to 
rely on." Weber, 140 Idaho at 94-95, 90 P.3d at 319-320 (quoting Kansas v. 
Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 139,899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1995)). 
The present case illustrates the concerns expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Custis, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Warren, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Weber. The Montana trial court that presided over Schwab's 
Montana DUI proceedings did not maintain audio recordings or transcripts of 
those proceedings. (R., pp.56, 62.) In such a situation, a defendant may be able 
to challenge the validity of his prior DUI conviction and create a triable issue of 
fact simply by, as the district court concluded Schwab did in this case, submitting 
false affidavits. While this case involves the rare circumstance where even a 
Sixth Amendment challenge cannot quickly be resolved from "the judgment roll 
itself, or accompanying minute order," it is representative of the necessary 
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"rummag[ing] through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state-court 
transcripts or records" that the United States Supreme Court sought to avoid. 
The district court correctly recognized that the only challenge Schwab 
could make to his Montana DUI conviction was a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel challenge. (R., p.126.) This Court should not consider additional 
grounds on appeal. 
D. Schwab Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding 
That He Waived His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel With Regard To 
His Montana Conviction 
After the state made a prima facie showing of the existence and validity of 
Schwab's 200B Montana DUI conviction, Schwab produced evidence, in the form 
of sworn affidavits, establishing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel challenge of 
the Montana conviction. (R., pp.50-75; 125-126.) The state rebutted Schwab's 
evidence with evidence of its own, that contradicted several of Schwab's 
assertions. (R., pp.BO-117.) 
The district court then concluded that pertinent factual allegations from 
Schwab's affidavits were false. (R., pp.123-130.) Specifically, the district court 
found Schwab intentionally provided a false address to the arresting officer and 
Montana court in order to keep himself willfully ignorant of the proceedings in the 
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Montana DUI case. 3 (ld.) The district court then concluded that Schwab had, 
through this conduct, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel with regard to 
his Montana DUI conviction. (ld.) 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a 
criminal defendant the right to counsel during all critical stages of the adversarial 
proceedings against him or her. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,562, 149 P.3d 
833,837 (2006); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). 
However, a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
through his conduct, and such a waiver may be implied. U.S. v. Murphy, 469 
F.3d 1130 (th Circ. 2009) (holding that a defendant who failed to provide 
financial information required to establish eligibility for court-appointed counsel, 
and who then failed to secure counsel during nine months between arraignment 
and start of trial impliedly waived his right to counsel, and recognizing that a 
defendant "may not use this [Sixth Amendment right] to playa 'cat and mouse' 
game with the court, or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial 
judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the 
3 While Schwab indicates that he "disagrees" with the district court's factual 
findings (Appellant's brief, p.11), he does not contend on appeal that any of these 
findings were clearly erroneous. In any event, the credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson 
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). In this case, the 
district court also found that Schwab's credibility was "further undermined" by the 
statements of the assigned Montana prosecuting attorney, who swore via 
affidavit that, contrary to Schwab's allegations, she never contacted Schwab and 
offered to amend the Montana DUI to "inattentive driving." (R., p.127.) 
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judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel") (quoting U.S. 
ex reI. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 618-619 (2nd Cir. 1967)). 
Several courts have held that where a defendant fails to appear at a trial 
after being advised of the trial date, he waives his right to counsel through his 
conduct. In State v. Robertson 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (S.C. 2009), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that when a defendant never appeared for a trial 
after being advised of the trial date, his "disregard for the instructions of the court, 
and his inexcusable absence from trial" constituted a "waiver by conduct of the 
right to counsel." In Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 496-497 (Ind. 2007), the 
defendant appeared at a scheduling conference, advised the court that he would 
be hiring an attorney, and was given a trial date. When the defendant failed to 
appear for the trial he was tried and convicted in absentia. & The Indiana 
Supreme Court held that the defendant, through his conduct, waived his right to 
counsel, and recognized that "a defendant cannot be permitted to manipulate the 
system simply by refusing to show up for trial." & See also Brewer v. Raines, 
670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982) (The defendant received notice of his original trial 
date but failed to appear. After several continuances, he was convicted at a trial 
in absentia on a future date. The defendant did not receive notice of the 
continued trial date. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
waived, through his conduct, his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses 
and be present at trial, recognizing, "[a] defendant cannot be allowed to keep 
himself deliberately ignorant and then complain about his lack of knowledge."); 
State v. Weaver, 179 P.3d 534 (Mont. 2008) (where trial court notified 
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defendant's appointed counsel of trial date, and defendant then failed to appear 
at trial, the defendant waived his right to be present at trial because he either 
knew of the trial date and was willfully absent therefrom, or he "kept himself 
deliberately ignorant of that trial date"). 
While it is true that in Robertson, Jackson, Brewer, and Weaver, the 
defendant, or the defendant's counsel, had actual knowledge of at least the 
original trial date setting, the reasoning of those cases applies to a situation 
where a defendant keeps himself willfully ignorant of an original trial setting date 
as well. The Montana trial court ordered Schwab to be personally present at any 
trial. (R., p.67.) In his "cat and mouse" game, Schwab then provided false 
information to two courts. He willfully gave a false address to a Montana court in 
an attempt to avoid the criminal proceedings there, and he then provided false 
affidavits to an Idaho district court in order to cast doubt on the validity of his prior 
Montana conviction. This is the type of disregard, manipulation, and deliberate 
ignorance which led to a recognition of a defendant's waiver of his Sixth 
Amendment rights in Robertson, Jackson, Brewer, and Weaver. 
The district court correctly concluded that Schwab had waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel with regard to his Montana DUI conviction. This 
Court should thus affirm his conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Schwab's motion in limine, and Schwab's conviction and sentence 
for felony driving under the influence. 
DATED this 14th day of December 2011. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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